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INTRODUCTION 
Although the literature on the conduct of monetary policy in less 
developed countries has grown rapidly in the last several years, no real 
consensus has emerged as the optimal policy objective that should be 
strived for by national monetary authorities (I). This study explores the 
desirability of adopting a relatively simple rule for the conduct of 
monetary policy in Saudi Arabia. 
While most Saudi officials accept price and output stability as the 
appropriate stabilization objectives of monetary policy, there has been 
apparent agreement on the best method suited for the attainment of 
these objectives <2>. Should the monetary authorities -- the Saudi Ara-
bian Monetary Agency (SAMA) <3>, use their intuition and judgement 
<4>, (discretion) in the determining of the behavior of the money supply 
most conducive to economic stability? Or on the other hand, do the 
difficulties of international price and interest rate (5) movements, 
pressures for massive development spending and limited knowledge of 
the economic forces at work in the country, make such discretion un-
promising or even dangerous (6)? 
More specifically, given that Saudi Arabian governmental interven-
tion of some sort is likely to be essential if monetary is to perform its 
traditional functions, the analysis below attempts to determine : 
1. what sort of institutional arrangements and rules are most likely to 
ensure the desirable behavior of money in Saudi Arabia; 
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2. should the rule (if adopted) be a simple or fixed rate of growth of the 
money supply, or should the rate of growth in the money supply be 
changed at infrequent intervals to reflect underlying structural 
changes in the economy (i.e. improvements in the efficiency of the 
banking system); 
3. on the other hand, might a more complex prescription for ad-
justments of the money supply to match shifts in its demand be more 
optimal? and 
4. should the rules be mechanical (automatic) or rest more with the 
discretion of the monetary authorities? 
The period selected for analysis was that from 1960 through 1979. 
This period is ideal for testing the possible benefits of alternative 
monetary policies because in general this was a period of rising 
government expenditures, thus providing the Saudi authorities with a 
good deal of leeway in controlling the level of government expenditures 
and also because the 1970s were a period of relative high rates of infla-
tion (in contrast to the falling price levels experienced in most of the 
early-mid 1980s). 
RELEVANCE OF SAUDI ARABIA 
While the problems of economic stability are quite common in less 
developed countries, Saudi Arabia is of additional interest because the 
country's vast oil revenues superimposed on a largely underdeveloped 
private sector, particularly the financial sector create a unique en-
vironment whereby many of the standard impacts associated with 
economic policy are much more straightforward, and thus easy to iden-
tify (?). 
More specifically, in Saudi Arabia <8>: 
1. Real income is dependent upon the economy's ability to import 
goods and services rather than its ability to produce goods and ser-
vices (other than oil); 
2. Government spending, even with a budget surplus, can still imply a 
stimulative fiscal policy (because most government revenue comes 
from abroad). 
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3. Stimulative fiscal policy leads directly to an increase in the money 
supply because of the underdeveloped state of the financial markets; 
4. Due to the absence of a sell developed financial system, the govern-
ment budget is the most important factor in determining the growth 
in reserve money (and thus the other measures of money); 
5. Because government revenue comes almost exclusively from abroad 
(rather than from domestic taxes), the appropriate definition of a 
balanced budget is not the conventional one of spending equalling 
receipts, but one of spending equalling imports of goods, services 
and foreign assets; 
6. This economic deficit analogy applies to the country's central bank 
--the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). When government 
spending (decline in government deposits) is greater than imports 
(decline in foreign assets), there be an increase in reserve money. 
Under these circumstances, the central bank must monetize 
government spending in excess of imports; 
7. The automatic neutralization of reserve money from government 
spending via imports is an important source of monetary stability. 
However, during the 1970s, the economic deficit increased as 
government spending increased faster than imorts. This led to a 
significant acceleration in Saudi Arabia's reserve money, currency, 
and inflation. 
In fact Darrat <9> has shown that inflation in Saudi Arabia is essen-
tially a monetary phenomenon. In addition his analysis indicates that 
external monetary factors (represented by movements in foreign interest 
rates) exert a significant influence upon inflation in Saudi Arabia. The 
implications of this finding are that monetary policy designed to 
counteract external effects on the domestic economy must take into ac-
count the specific response of domestic money demand to these external 
elements. It should be noted however, that Durrat's results show that 
the effects of these factors on Saudi Arabian inflation, while statically 
significant, are relatively small, with a long run elasticity of only 0.10 
Hence, there is little support for the argument that Saudi Arabia's in-
flation is substantially imported. 
• 
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· In addition Durrat's empirical results show that inflation in Saudi 
Arabia has its origin largely in domestic sources. In particular, the 
public's expectations of higher inflation play a significant role in caus-
ing inflation in the Kingdom (IO). 
The main policy implications of this analysis are that the most effec-
tive tool to mitigation inflation in Saudi Arabia is restraint in the money 
supply growth. The acceleration of the growth of money in the 1970s, 
therefore can be viewed as essentially a monetary phenomena. More 
specifically, Durrat's results indicate that prices in Saudi Arabia quickly 
adjust to monetary changes whereby the total impact; of money supply 
growth in inflation is virtually completed in less than one year (I I). Such 
short-lag adjustment of the money supply growth along with a strong 
impact on inflation, implies that restrictive monetary policy can be an 
exceptionally effective measure to control Saudi inflation. Since the 
prime determinant of monetary growth lies in domestic government 
expenditures, effective control over money supply growth lies in a ra-
tionalization of government expenditures. 
To summarize, an analysis of aggregate data shows that a close rela-
tionship between the domestic budget balance, liquidity expansion, and 
inflation in Saudi Arabia. Fiscal policy is the primary determinant of 
domestic liquidity and aggregate domestic demand. Ultimately the 
government's budget must be the primary instrument of demand 
management. 
OIL REVENUES, THE MONEY SUPPLY AND INFLATION 
The success of economic policy is rightly judged in terms of the 
economic objectives to which it is directed. The primary economic ob-
jective of Saudi policy makers since the oil price increase of late 1973 
and early 1974 has been to secure rapid growth and development of the 
non-oil sector in a context of price stability. This emphasis reflects the 
official Saudi view that the country's longer term economic and social 
goals will best be achieved within a framework of reasonable financial 
stability. 
Concern with monetary stability began soon after 1973 as the rate of 




Rapid and accelerating inflation was clearly imparting excessive costs to 
the country's growth through 0 2>: 
1. the diversion of resources into speculative activities; 
2. its adverse impact on private sector confidence, and 
3. the encouragement of a relatively undiversified economy. 
Output and employment were not hindered by insufficient demand, 
but rather by supply constraints (13). Until these bottlenecks were eased, 
the primary effect of incremental domestic expenditure was increased 
inflation 0 4>, reaching double digit proportions for the first time in the 
country's history (15). 
Oil revenues and the money supply are closely related as indicated by 
the conventional presentation of the IMF monetary survey 0 6>. The rise 
in the net foreign assets in the Saudi banking system are shown in the 
survey as the primary factor responsible for the growth of liquidity dur-
ing the post 1973 period. The large increase in government deposits is 
the main offseting factor 0 7>. 
On the surface, Saudi Arabia fiscal policy, and in particular its 
monetary implications, appear contradictory. However, the monetary 
survey conceals the fact that the government's fiscal operations con-
stitute the primary determinant of changes in money and quasi-money. 
Clearly, the receipt of oil revenues by the government is the main factor 
underlying the rise in the country's holdings of foreign assets. In con-
trast to the usual situation in most countries, foreign assets do not, 
however, haves an immediate monetary impact in Saudi Arabia (since 
they directly offset a rise in government deposits). Only to the extent 
that the Saudi government injects this revenue into the domestic income 
stream through public sector domestic expenditures will the inflow of 
foreign exchange be translated into domestic liquidity (IS). 
More precisely, the impact of fiscal policy (and thus monetary policy) 
on domestic economy of Saudi Arabia (where a substantial volume of 
external receipts and payments passes directly through the government's 
budget) can be best seen by examining the domestic budget balance, 
rather than the overall budget balance. Using this approach 0 9>, Saudi 
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Arabia's money supply identity can be depicted as: 
AM = (ACp + BPp) + (Gd - Rd - Ld) +A A 
where: A M = change in domestic liquidity (money plus guasi money) 
Acp = change in claims of the banking system on the private 
sector 
BPp = balance of payments of the private sector 
Gd = government domestic expenditures 
Rd = government domestic revenues. 
Ld = government borrowing from domestic non-bank sector 
A NUA = change in the net unclassified assets of the banking 
system 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 
Based on the previous discussion it is apparent that the main deter-
minants of the Saudi Arabian money supply are: 
1. the domestic budget position of the public sector; 
2. the balance of payments deficit of the private sector; and 
3. the change in domestic bank credit to the private sector. 
Note that government external transitions do not appear in the identity 
(reflecting the fact they do not contt'ibute directly to the monetary crea-
tion process). 
Saudi oil revenues, therefore, do not, in general, create many of the 
monetary stabilization problems that normally facing developing coun-
tries. Because oil revenues accrue directly to the government (rather 
than the private sector), they are automatically sterilized. The relevant 
transmission mechanism is not, therefor, the famlliar one operating 
through movements in the balance of payments, but rather the 
government budget. Hence, the surge in oil revenues in 1974 did not, in 
itself, generate a rise in domestic liquidity. Similarly, the recent leveling 
off and decline in oil revenues has not per se directly reduced private 
sector liquidity. Such a reduction has resulted only to the extent that 
there has been a deceleration in net government domestic spending. 
10 
--------,----· 
Clearly the country's oil revenues could have remained in excess of 
government spending indefinitely, with no acceleration in domestic li-
quidity. Excess revenues could have always been invested in riskless in-
terest earning foreign assets. In theory, official decision as to how much 
oil to produce and how much excess revenue to acquire should not de-
pend on domestic stabilization needs, but rather whether or not the in-
terest rate on foreign assets was better or worse than the return of ap-
preciation in value of oil in the ground; i.e. the decision should be on 
whether or not the future price of oil will change by more than the cur-
rent level of interest (20). 
At the practical level, however, the excess of revenue over spending in 
the 1970s and early 1980s tended to create a major political problem for 
the government (since the only way that individual citizens could benefit 
from the increased foreign exchange earnings was through the govern-
ment's domestic budget allocations). As in most OPEC countries, the 
substantial budget surplus in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s created strong 
incentives to increase public spending. During this period, the number 
of projects proposed in the budget easily exceeded the number which 
could be carefully planned. Projects also tended to be more elaborate 
and costly that would otherwise have been the case. At the same time, 
the resulting increase in aggregate demand led to a higher than optimal 
rate of inflation, rate <21 >. 
In short, many of Saudi Arabia's stabilization problems stem from 
the fact that developments in international oil markets have tended to 
progress much more rapidly than the country's domestic institutions 
have evolved. 
In particular, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, the country's 
central bank, has relatively narrow functions. It is not able to conduct 
open market operations because of the lack of a domestic government 
securities market. Also, its charter prohibits it from lending to the 
commercial banking system (or the government); i.e. using the discount 
rate. While lacking many of the tools used by most cental banks <22>, 
SAMA was able to maintain a steady expansion of the money supply 
until 1973. For a number of years after that time increased government 
expenditures and the rapid expansion of the domestic banking system 
made monetary control extremely difficult <23>. 
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Sooner or later the country must develop a level of financial 
management more compatible with the transformed economic situa-
tion. Without institutional improvements in the fiscal and monetary 
policy machinery and in the monitoring of policy execution, the capaci-
ty of the country to devise and implement efficient stabilization pro-
grams will remain somewhat limited. 
OPTIONS FOR SAUDI ARABIAN MONETARY POLICY 
While it is becoming clear that Saudi Arabia; must adopt a more 
sophisticated approach to the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy to 
assure optimal utilization of its oil revenues, considerable general 
disagreement still exists in the economics profession as to the proper 
conduct of monetary policy. Some economists believe that the monetary 
authority should be passive in its policy stance, merely making sure that 
the money supply grows steadily from year to year. Others believe that 
the monetary authority should pursue an active monetary policy in 
which the money supply may grows very rapidly one year and very 
slowly in the next (depending on the over all economic climate and the 
objectives of policy). Typically this issue is summarized as the "rules vs 
discretion" debate (24). 
In justifying discretion, R.S. Sayers <25> observed that the very 
essence of central banking is discretionary control of the 
monetary system ... And working to rule is the antithesis of 
central banking. A central bank is necessary only then the 
community decides that discretionary element is desirable. 
In contrast, Sargent and Wallance contend that 
There is no longer any serious doubt about whether monetary 
policy should be conducted according to rules or discretion. 
Quite appropriately, it is widely agreed that monetary policy 
should obey a rule (26). 
This conflict of views is, however, probably more apparent than real. 
For example, Sayers feels discret,ion is exercised whenever there is any 
intervention in the free market's provision of the means of payment, 
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while Sargent and Wallace insist that monetary policy be guided by a 
systematic interpretation of events and their consequences--i.e. an 
economic model. 
Resolution of the debate over rules versus discretion in the conduct of 
monetary policy appears to hings the solution of two separate, but 
related problems (27>: 
1. Determining the most appropriate model to apply to describe the 
relationship between monetary instruments and economic ag-
gregates; and 
2. determining the appropriate decision rules to be followed by policy 
makers when setting their instruments (given their goals and their 
model of the economy). 
This paper is primarily interested in the decision rule problem and is 
only indirectly concerned with question of whose model is best. 
The major claim made by proponents of a Friedman-type <28> rule is 
that the implementation of the type of policy will result in the rate of 
growth of income becomeing more stable (29). For this result to apply to 
Saudi Arabia, there must be a stable demand for money in that country; 
i.e. that the velocity of money is stable (30). In the Friedman framework, 
it is assumed that a stable relationship exists between real money 
balances and real permanent income. Short term fluctuations in velocity 
are explained in terms of discrepancies between measured and perma-
nent income. It follows that velocity rises when measured income ex-
ceeds permanent income, and falls when permanent income exceeds 
measured income. This explanation is consistent with the observed 
tendency in the United States for felicity to increase in an upswing and 
to fall during a downswing (31). 
The advocates of monetary rules, therefore, believe that economies 
implementing policy along these lines will suffer only minor fluctua-
tions; i.e. fluctuations-in income growth will be less the more stable the 
expansion of the money supply. Similarly, economies will experience 
major fluctuations if the monetary authorities engage in discretionary 
monetary policy. Friedman's basic position is that more often than not, 
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monetary authorities unintentionally cause destabilizing movements in 
economic activity. Proponents of discretionary monetary policy, on the 
other hand, contend that monetary authorities by delicately 
manipulating the growth in money can prevent their economies from 
falling into massive recession (or getting caught up in an accelerating 
inflation). Discretionary policy advocates admit that authorities may 
make mistakes, and that when they do, the entire economy will suffer. 
However they insist there is no evidence that indicates a monetary rule 
would out perform discretionary policy in terms of stabilizing the 
economy with a high level of employment and acceptable price behavior 
(32). 
The more important criticisms made of the advocates of the use of 
discretionary monetary policies in developing countries can be grouped 
under the following four broad headings (33>: 
1. The relative ineffectiveness of monetary measures in regulating or 
controlling aggregate demand as compared with direct controls and 
fiscal measures. The claim that monetary policy takes a relatively 
long time to produce results falls under this heading. 
2. The relative uncertainty of the impact of monetary measures owing 
to the complex relationship between the supply of money and ag-
gregate demand, it is more difficult to predict the effect of monetary 
measures on demand than it is the effect of direct controls and fiscal 
measures. 
3. The relative bluntness of monetary measures which connot be ap-
plied as selectively as fiscal measures and direct controls to influence 
the patterns of production, investment and consumption. 
4. The irrelevance of monetary measures to many of the problems 
related to internal and external equilibrium. Monetary measures 
whether effective or not are directed at regulating aggregate effective 
demand. The resort to such measures in order to resolve the pro-
blems of internal and external disequilibrium (inflation, unemploy-
ment and balance of payments difficulties) is thus based on the 
presumption that these problems are caused primarily by a deficiency 




problems of disequilibrium are caused by economic and social fac-
tors not related to aggregate demand. 
Which is appropriate monetary policy for a growing economy such as 
Saudi Arabia's? Ultimately this becomes an empirical issue, whereby 
past economic performance can be simulated and assessed in terms of 
alternative policy strategies. The relevant issues, then, include: 
1. the specification of alternative policy designs to contrast the 
economic impacts that presumably would have resulted if a rule had 
been in effect, with those associated with actual discretionary policy; 
and 
2. A statical criteria for unambiguously determining the superiority of 
one of the policy designs (34). 
THE USE OF RULES IN THE CONDUCT OF SAUDI ARABIAN 
MONETARY POLICY 
In examining the applicability of rules to the conduct of monetary 
management in Saudi Arabia, the first proposal that comes to mind is of 
course Friedman's suggestion of a constant growth of the money stock 
<35). This type of rule is not claimed to be optimal in any sort of linear 
programming sense. It is only contended by Friedman and his followers 
<36), that the lags in response of the economy to variations in monetary 
policy are so long and variable in length and the ability to forecast 
future events so limited, that pursuit of an active anti-cyclical monetary 
policy may (and probably will) give results which are inferior to that 
produced by a constant increase in the money supply. 
On the other hand, Friedman himself has cautioned against the 
adoption of this type of rigid monetary expansion in the context of less 
developed countries (37): 
A small country ... that seeks to maintain fixed rates of ex-
change between its own currency and currencies of most other 
countries without using foreign exchange controls or their 
equivalent has little leeway with respect to monetary policy. Its 
stock of money must be whatever is required to maintain ex-
ternal equilibrium. 
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This argument, however, presumes that: 
1. the country will, for periods of time encounter sizable balance of 
payments deficits (due to an excessive rate of monetary expansion); 
2. the money supply is greatly influenced by actions in the private sec-
tor. 
Since neither of these conditions are likely to be present in Saudi 
Arabia, the major theoretical objection usually given to the adoption 
of a rule is not as strong as would usually be the case for many 
developing countries. 
In addition, the adoption of a simple constant growth rate rule of 
money expansion in the Suadi Arabia context is not necessarily ir-
responsible because of the fact that: 
1. the empirkally observed stability in the country of the demand for 
money (3S). 
2. the difficulty of collecting and interpreting economic data with suf-
ficient speed to implement an activist discretionary po!icy; 
3. the political temptation to over spend oil revenues. 
In sum, the constant growth rate rule does have several advantages 
that recommend its use in the Saudi Arabian context: 
1. in principle the country should, because of the stability in the de-
mand for money, be able to control its domestic money supply; and 
2. given the country's still abundant oil revenues, there is no reason 
why balance of payments equilibria would not be possible with 
whatever domestic price level results from the application of a 
monetary rule over a reasonable range of growth rates. 
In terms of the actual rate of monetary increase under a rule, Fried-
man argues for one yielding a low or negative rate of inflation. A rule 
yielding this result is attractive in Saudi Arabia's case. Inflation is a tax 
imposed on the holding of cash. Clearly if prices fall, cash yields a 
positive return. If the public could be encouraged with such a positive 
return to satisfy a large part of their liquidity needs for money balances, 
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fewer real assets would need to be diverted into providing other 
generally more costly forms of liquidity <39>. In addition, because money 
is the dominant form of financial wealth in Saudi Arabia, the rate of 
inflation can have a significant effect on the development of financial 
instruments and hence ultimately the efficiency of resource allocation in 
the kingdom (40). 
Several technical issues would need to be addressed before a monetary 
rule could be implemented in Saudi Arabia. First is the argument that 
the authorities may not have sufficient control over the money supply to 
be able to implement the rule. As noted, the authorities can not in-
fluence the money supply directly through open market operations or 
the discount rate, but they can change the reserve ratio. The critical 
question is, therefore, whether SAMA has sufficient power to offset 
fluctuations in the money supply caused by such factors as: 
1. changes in the desired currency to deposit ratio; 
2. changes in the banks desired excess cash to deposit ratio; and 
3. movements in deposits to Bahrain and other off shore accounts. 
Because money enters the economy largely through government expen-
ditures, changes in base money, shifts in the currency deposit ratio, the 
excess cash to deposit ratio, and movements of deposits from off shore 
financial centers, there will have to be close coordination between 
SAMA and the Ministry of Finance if monetay growth targets are to be 
met. 
Although money supply control does pose difficulties for the adop-
tion of a rule, it is also true, however, that any lack of control over the 
money supply presents equally serious difficulties for discretionary 
policy. Clearly if the rule cannot be precisely followed neither can ef-
fective discretionary policy be implemented. 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The simple Cambridge version of the quantity theory of money is the 
basis of the original framework for monetary rules <41 >. According to 
the Cambridge theory, the nominal demand for money (Md) is a stable 
function (which is normally assumed to vary inversely with the market 
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rate of interest) of nominal income (Y). Since nominal income is the 
expressed product of real output (Y) and the price level (p), it follows 
that: 
(1) Md = kY = kyp 
If we further assume that the supply of money Ms is determined by 
the authorities so that Ms = Md, then the equilibrium condition that 
the supply and demand for money must be equal means that the public 
will respond to produce: 
(2) Ms = kyp 
Equation (2) states that given the value of k and y, the money supply 
determines the price level; i.e. that real output is independent of the 
money supply in the long run. In the short run, however, the monetary 
sector is likely to affect output because the price level will usually not 
fully adjust instantaneously to eliminate discrepancies between the 
supply and demand for money. Also, since not all prices are likely to 
change at the same rate, relative price and the pattern of production 
may also be distorted in the short run. 
Equation (2) suggests that Saudi Arabian monetary policy should 
concentrate on manipulating the money supply so as to foster the 
desired behavior of output and the price level. This in turn requires off-
seting any changes in the proportion of income held in monetary 
balances (k) which in turn may threaten to create undesirable 
movements in the money demand-supply relationship. 
Since growth in output over time takes place as population, labor, 
productivity, capital and technology increase, equation (2) is best for-
mulated as percentage rates of change of all the variables in equation 
(2): 
(3) gm = gk + gy + gp 
As noted, monetary growth (gm) is best targeted at the rate of growth 
of full employment output (gy) plus the desired rate of inflation (gp) 




It is possible to hypothesize the behavior of velocity for (gk) in equa-
tion (3) and then examine the behavior of nominal income implied by 
some monetary rule. This is the approach (albeit with significant dif-
ferences) taken by Bronfenbrenner and Modigliani. 
The Bronfenbrenner Test 
Bronfenbrenner's guidelines <42> for monetary policy are derived from 
equation (3) above. This approach assumes that neither the growth in 
real income nor the rate of change in velocity is sensitive to relatively 
small veriations in the rate of change in money. From this it follows that 
the ideal rate of monetary growth, dMo/Mo, is: 
(4) dMo/Mo = dY /Y - dV /V = dM/M - dP/P 
The rate of inflation dPr /Pr due to the operation of a smaple rule 
of constant monetary growth is: 
(5) dMr/Mr = dPr/Pr + dY /Y - dV /V 
where dMr/Mr represents some constant rate of increase in 
money. If dY /Y and dV /V are known, the equation can be solved 
for dPr/Pr. 
The errors in the actual monetary gorwth would be: 
(6)dM/M - dMo/Mo = dM/M - dYo/Yo + dV/V 
where dYo/Yo represents the growth in full capacity output. 
Substituting (1) for dM/M: 
(7) dM/M - dMo/Mo = dP /P - (dYo/Yo - dY /Y) 
Since (dYo/Yo) - (dY /Y) represents the output slack, the error in 
actual monetary growth is equal to the actual rate of inflation less 
the differences in output. 
The judgement rule can now be contrasted with that obtained with the 
application of a simple monetary growth rule by comparing the errors in 
(5) with those obtained in (4). 
Bronfenbrenner's monetary tests can be grouped into three broad 
areas: 
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1. a judgment rule; 
2. the constant growth rule; and 
3. a lag formula. 
As its name suggests, only the judgement rule allows the monetary 
authority to use its own discretion in response to a given monetary 
situation. Given the historical growth of real non-oil GDP, the re-
quirements of the inflaxible growth rule probably require (in the Saudi 
context) a 10 or 12 percent annual rate of growth of the money supply. 
Bronfenbrenner's lag formula specifies the rate of growth of money 
supply to be adjusted in accordance with the prior year's fluctuations in 
the growth of real output and income velocity. 
Using the above framework for the non-discretionary cases, 
Bronfenbrenner computes a hypothetical rate of price change as: 
(8) di (dP/P)i = (dM/M)i - (dM/M)o 
(dM/M)i = (dY /Y - dV /V) 
where (dP/P)i, (dM/M)i and (dM/M)o are again the respective 
rates of growth in prices, the actual money stock, and the ideal stock 
of money. dV /V is, of course the rate of change in income velocity ·1 
of money. 
The lag rule can be represented as: 
(9)(dM/M)t = (dY/Y - dV/V)t-1 
In using these rules, the most logical type of test for superiority is 
the mean algebraic deviations of alternative monetary growth rates 
from the target growth (the rate of growth which generates a zero 
rate of price increase). This can be computed as: 
n 
(10) p = L (di/N) 
i = 1 
where n is the number of observations and P denotes the algebraic 
deviation from the target figure. 
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According to this test, the rule under consideration out performes its 
rivals if it has a smaller P (in addition to a smaller standard deviation). 
Bronfenbrenner's analysis is best seen as a comparison of how closely 
an economy would have approached the ideal of stable prices in the past 
under various alternative rules of monetary expansion as compared with 
how closely stable prices were actually achieved. In order to judge how 
the price level would have behaved under monetary policies other than 
those actually employed, it is explicitly assumed that aggregate real in-
come and the income velocity of money are not affected by changes in 
the quantity of money (or by its level). Based on the quantity theory, 
this implies that the appropriate monetary policy can maintain the price 
level absolutely constant (although we may be unable to determine until 
later that the appropriate monetary policy would have been). 
Without any a priori judgment as to the best measure of income or 
money, simulations with two income measures--non oil gross domestic 
product, and gross domestic product, together with four measures of 
money: currency (MC), currency plus demand deposits (Ml), (Ml) plus 
quasi money (M2), (M2) plus government deposits (M3), and M3 plus 
other net items in the International Monetary Fund monetary survey 
(M4), were used in the analysis. 
The results of aplying Bronfenbrenner's criteria to the Saudi Arabian 
economy reveal several distinct patterns (Table 1 and 2): 
1. The relationship between Ml and M2 and the ideal pattern is 
somewhat similar. On the other hand, M3 and M4 also follow a 
similar pattern, but one quite different from Ml, and M2. MC 
follows its own separate pattern, but one closet to Ml and M2 rather 
than M3 and M4. 
2. In terms of the standard deviation test, MC, Ml and M2 are much 
more stable than M3 and M4 with MC in theneral the most stable for 
the 1960-79 period. 
3. In general, the discretion rule out performs the lag rule in terms of its 
stability; with the lag rule, Ml and M2 are slightly below the rate of 
growth consistent with price stability, while M3 and M4 are only a bit 
over one percent greater than the)deal rate. 
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TABLE 1 
TEST OF THE BRONFENBRENNER MONETARY MODEL FOR SAUDI ARABIA 
(Gross Domestic Product) 
1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule= 80Jo 
MC -3.35 15.71 -0.71 -2.40 5.86 -1.30 -1.10 22.58 -0.41 
Ml -5.09 17.72 -1.25 -0.46 4.67 -0.30 -10.82 24.72 -1.31 
M2 -5.28 15.65 -1.47 -2.11 4.24 -1.50 -9.30 22.28 -1.25 
N M3 -10.59 23.68 -1.94 -5.53 20.30 -0.82 -16.49 27.84 -1.78 
N M4 -11.55 19.93 -2.52 -7.63 18.92 -1.21 -16.27 22.07 -2.21 
Rule= lOOJo 
MC -1.35 15.71 -0.38 -0.41 5.86 -0.21 -3.10 22.57 -0.41 
Ml -3.09 17.72 -0.76 1.53 4.67 0.99 -8.82 24.72 -1.07 
M2 -3.28 15.65 -0.91 -1.13 4.24 -0.08 -7.30 22.28 -0.98 
" • 
M3 -8.59 23.68 -1.58 -3.53 20.30 -0.52 -14.49 27.84 -1.56 
M4 -9.55 19.93 -2.09 -5.63 18.91 -0.89 -14.27 22.07 -1.94 
Rule = 120Jo 
MC 0.64 15.71 0.17 1.59 5.86 0.82 -1.10 22.58 -0.15 
Ml -1.09 17.23 -0.27 3.53 4.67 2.27 -6.82 24.72 -0.83 
M2 -1.28 15.65 -0.36 1.89 4.24 1.34 -5.30 22.28 -0.71 
M3 -6.59 23.68 -1.21 -1.53 20.30 -0.23 -12.49 27.84 -1.35 





1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule = 140Jo 
MC 2.65 15.71 0.73 3.59 5.86 1.84 0.90 22.58 0.12 
Ml 0.91 17.71 0.22 5.54 4.67 3.58 -4.82 24.72 -0.59 
M2 0.72 15.65 0.20 3.89 4.24 2.75 -3.30 22.28 -0.44 
M3 -4.59 23.68 -0.85 0.47 20.30 0.07 -10.49 27.84 -1.13 
M4 -5.55 19.93 -1.21 -1.63 18.92 -0.26 -10.27 22.07 -1.40 
N 
w Rule= 80Jo 
MC -2.86 9.11 -1.37 -2.20 5.60 -1.18 -4.47 11.97 -1.12 
Ml -4.20 8.84 -2.07 -0.27 4.71 -0.17 -9.33 9.57 -2.92 
M2 -4.62 7.31 -2.75 -1.89 4.25 -1.34 -8.32 8.30 -3.01 
M3 -15.64 48.52 -1.41 -5.14 20.32 -0.76 -27.69 67.61 -1.22 
M4 -15.88 44.20 -1.57 -7.21 18.91 -1.14 -25.99 61.79 -1.26 
Rule = lOOJo 
MC -0.86 9.11 -0.41 -0.20 5.60 -0.11 -2.47 11.97 -0.62 
Ml -2.20 8.84 -1.08 1.73 4.71 1.10 -7.33 9.58 -2.30 
M2 -2.62 7.31 -1.56 0.11 4.25 0.08 -6.32 8.30 -2.28 
M3 -13.63 48.51 -1.23 -3.14 20.32 -0.46 -25.69 67.61 -1.14 
M4 -13.88 44.20 -1.37 -5.21 18.92 -0.83 -23.99 61.79 -1.16 
(Continued) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-----'-~------~?~-~-.. .;..;... .. ~------~·--~ ~~ 
(Non-Oil GDP) 
1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= O Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule= 12% 
MC 1.14 9.11 0.55 1.80 5.60 0.97 -0.47 11.97 -0.12 
Ml -0.19 8.84 -0.10 3.73 4.71 2.37 -5.33 9.58 -1.67 
M2 -0.62 7.31 -0.37 2.11 4.25 1.49 -4.32 8.30 -1.56 
M3 -11.64 48.52 -1.05 -1.14 20.32 -0.17 -23.69 67.61 -1.05 
M4 - 11.87 44.20 -1.17 -3.21 18.92 -0.51 -21.99 61.79 -1.07 
N Rule = 140Jo 
"'" MC 3.14 9.11 1.50 3.80 5.60 2.04 1.53 11.97 0.38 
Ml 1.80 8.84 0.88 5.73 4.71 3.65 -3.33 9.58 -1.04 
M2 1.38 7.34 0.82 4.11 4.25 2.90 -2.32 8.30 -0.84 
M3 -9.64 48.51 0.86 0.86 20.32 0.13 -21.68 67.61 -0.96 
M4 -9.88 44.21 -0.97 -1.21 18.92 -0.19 -20.00 61.79 -0.97 
,,, 
• Rule = 16% 
MC 5.14 9.11 1.96 5.80 5.60 3.62 3.53 11.97 1.22 
Ml 3.80 8.83 1.88 7.73 4.71 4.92 -1.33 9.58 -0.42 
M2 3.37 7.31 2.01 6.11 4.25 4.31 -0.32 8.30 -0.12 
M3 -7.64 48.52 -0.69 2.86 20.32 0.42 -19.69 67.61 -0.87 










1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
0 • Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 




Ml 5.97 8.89 2.92 1.40 1.86 2.27 10.97 11.00 2.99 
M2 6.21 9.45 2.86 1.29 1.88 2.05 11.61 11.62 2.99 
M3 -4.10 31.89 -0.56 -1.46 6.61 -0.66 -7.33 47.15 -0.47 
M4 -2.67 29.75 -0.39 -1.44 
N 




Ml 0.02 9.81 0.01 -0.23 7.80 -0.08 -0.56 12.83 0.12 
M2 -0.07 8.75 0.03 0.10 6.75 0.04 0.74 11.47 0.18 
M3 1.36 66.21 0.09 3.76 29.20 0.36 6.91 97.09 0.20 
M4 1.41 61.81 0.09 3.85 27.26 0.40 5.14 91.14 0.16 
" 
I Rule = 16% 
MC 4.65 15.71 1.35 5.59 5.86 4.14 2.90 22.58 1.27 
Ml 2.91 17.71 0.72 7.54 4.67 4.84 -2.82 24.72 -0.34 
M2 2.72 15.65 0.76 5.89 4.24 4.17 -1.30 22.28 -0.18 
M3 -2.59 23.68 -0.48 2.47 20.31 0.37 -8.49 27.84 -0.91 




(Gross Domestic Product) 
1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 




Ml 5.07 14.05 1.57 1.21 0.55 6.46 9.48 20.06 1.42 
M2 5.55 14.13 1.71 1.07 0.55 5.87 10.62 19.84 1.61 
M3 0.94 7.80 0.52 -1.84 6.69 -0.83 3.87 8.58 1.35 
N M4 1.66 6.99 1.04 -1.86 6.34 -0.88 5.43 6.25 2.60 
°' Lag Policy 
MC 
~ • Ml -0.26 22.76 -0.05 -0.09 7.80 -0.03 -1.49 34.47 -0.12 
M2 -0.21 20.12 -0.04 0.26 6.88 0.11 -1.39 30.47 -0.13 
M3 1.14 30.47 0.16 3.97 29.28 0.38 4.11 35.01 0.33 
M4 1.17 26.16 0.19 4.10 27.38 0.42 2.39 28.69 0.24 
,) 
q •<·_,,,.,- ; p ';;; A4 ---~~ 
---·= F----- -- --- - T ::::. 
TABLE 2 
SAUDI ARABIA: APPLICATION OF THE BRONFENBRENNER MONETARY MODEL 
(Percent) 
12% Rule Discretionary Policy Lag Policy 
Ml M2 Ml M2 Ml M2 
Ml Non-Oil M2 Non-Oil Ml Non-Oil M2 Non-Oil Ml Non-Oil M2 Non-Oil 
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP 
1961 8.25 8.41 5.22 5.48 1.41 1.56 1.40 1.66 
, 
-
-3.85 1962 2.71 1.21 3.10 1.63 0.89 -0.60 0.94 -0.54 -5.54 -2.12 -7.20 
1963 -5.22 -4.85 -5.23 -4.86 0.33 0.71 0.33 0.70 -7.94 -8.34 -6.07 -6.49 
1964 9.76 11.00 6.48 7.90 2.14 3.38 1.98 3.40 14.99 11.72 15.85 12.76 
1965 4.45 3.43 2.31 1.28 1.12 0.10 0.93 -0.11 -5.31 -4.16 -7.57 -6.62 
"-> 1966 0.14 -0.02 -3.15 -3.36 0.93 ...J 0.78 0.42 0.20 -4.32 -5.46 -3.45 -4.64 
l967 3.33 3.42 1.04 1.12 1.74 1.83 1.43 1.52 3.19 4.19 3.44 4.45 
1968 0.84 4.42 -0.08 3.50 1.57 5.15 1.49 5.07 -2.49 -1.12 1.01 2.38 
1969 7.56 6.55 7.30 6.29 0.73 -0.28 0.70 -0.31 6.71 7.37 2.12 2.78 
1970 8.03 10.65 6 . .42 8.13 0.17 1.98 0.15 1.80 1.78 -0.88 4.11 1.84 
1971 15.53 4.36 12.52 0.81 12.96 1.80 13.05 1.35 6.70 6.10 -6.29 -7.31 
" • 
1972 -16.93 -21.91 -15.33 -20.14 0.97 -4.02 1.58 3.23 -32.46 -27.84 -26.28 20.95 
1973 -1.64 -12.64 1.77 -8.70 14.91 3.89 15.72 5.25 15.29 9.26 17.09 11.44 
1974 41.25 -5.33 39.60 -8.33 58.53 11.95 58.85 10.92 42.88 7.32 37.84 0.37 
1975 -24.94 -3.35 -17.30 2.32 10.31 31.90 14.90 34.53 -66.19 1.98 -56.91 10.65 
1976 -39.07 -6.30 -35.30 -3.56 -9.49 23.27 -7.34 24.40 -14.13 -2.95 -17.99 -5.88 
1977 -28.11 -13.10 -24.58 -10.02 -3.30 11.72 -1.57 12.99 10.96 -6.79 10.72 -6.47 
1978 -11.16 1.45 -10.49 2.00 -1.21 11.39 -0.99 11.50 16.95 14.54 14.09 12.02 
1979 3.65 8.82 1.38 6.73 1.69 6.85 1.41 6.76 14.81 7.37 11.87 4.73 
------~<--
4. For Ml and M2, the constant growth rate out performs both the 
discretion rule and the lag rule over the 1960-79 period. The mean for 
a 14 percent constant growth of the money supply is much closer to 
zero for Ml and M2 than the case for competing rules, with the 
standard deviation on the whole a bit lower for M2, and only slightly 
higher for Ml. 
5. For both Ml and M2, a constant growth of 14 percent would, in 
general, have been the best policy in terms of maintaining price 
stability and minimizing erratic fluctuations in the money supply. A 
12 percent rate would have been best for currency. 
6. If the constant rate rule were not adopted, discretionary policy.¢ 
would have been superior to some sort of a lag rule. 
7. The results are best for non-oil gross domestic product. This measure 
of income should, therefore, be used by the Saudi authorities in im-
plementing stabilization policy. 
It should be noted, however, that two fairly distinct sub-periods are 
present, 1960-69 and 1970-79. The rates of optimal money growth vary 
considerably between these periods with the earlier period associated 
with a much more stable environment and lower optimal rates of 
growth. In general, however, a constant rate of growth in the money 
supply would have been preferable in each sub-period. 
A number of objections may be raised against Bronfenbrenner's test. 
One is the assumption that both real output and velocity are not af-
fected by changes in money; another is the absence of any distributed 
lag impact that monetary policy may have on output. Most serious is the 
representation of ideal money in terms of the price level alone with no 
reference to ideal output or employment levels. There is also some 
question as to the relevance for future policy guidelines of the pre-1973 
years in any test of rules versus discretion. Another difficulty with 
Bronfenbrenner's test is that the simple rule is assumed to be superim-
posed in each year on top of the actual money supply obtaining at the 
beginning of the year; yet if the rule had in fact been implemented in the 
earlier years, the money supply would have been quite different from 
that actually prevailing at the start· of the year. 
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Modigliani's Model Application to Saudi Arabia 
According to Modigliani <43), the monetary authority is confronted 
with the double objective of obtaining price stability and full employ-
ment. To assess the performance of the monetary authority, Modigliani 
developes a measure of target money supply (the ideal money supply in 
his mode). Next, this is compared with the actual money supply or sup-
ply dictated by a monetary rule. Stated symbolically, the target money 
supply is given by: 
(11) Mo = (Pt)(Y o )/V = Zt/V 
Where Mo is the target money supply, P is the target price level, Yo the 
target real income, V the income velocity of circulation, and Z the target 
money income. Implementing tests of the principal variations of this 
formula involves one principal problem--finding the empirical approx-
imations of each of the above variables. 
Modigliani's approach is easily more ambitious than 
Bronfenbrenner's. In effect it attempts to deal with the major objection 
to the Bronfenbrenner test; i.e. that it overlooks the employment target 
and defines the ideal money supply with reference to the Price level 
alone. Using Bronfenbrenner's framework, Modigliani defines 
(dMo/Mo) in terms of a zero rate of inflation as well as a satisfactory 
level of employment. The critical equation in the Modigliani test is: 
(12) dMo/Mo = dYo/Yo - dV /V 
where the rate of inflation is again set at zero, dYo/Yo represents the 
rate of growth of real output consistent with near full employment of 
resources. As in the Bronfenbrenner test, velocity is again assumed to be 
invariant to the rate of change in the money supply. The errors in this 
test are simply the difference between the ideal money supply and the 
money supply dictated by the rule (constant growth rates). 
(13) dMr/Mr - dMo/Mo = dMr/Mr - dYo/Yo + dV/V 
These errors can be calculated for each period, since dMr /Mr, dY o/Yo 
and DV /V are all known. 
In order to define the target price level, we need to operationally 
29 
define Modigliani's rather vague notion of "stabilizing the price level". 
Following, Modigliani, we define this concept operationally by identi-
fying the target price level in period (t) with the level ruling at the 
beginning of the period; i.e. the price level ending the previous time 
(year) period. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this assumption would imply that in 
the short run--here a year--SAMA should refuse to supply and validate 
price increases above the opening price level (even though this policy 
might lead to less than full utilization of the kingdom's economic 
potential during the time period). At the same time, if prices have 
nonetheless changed in the year--whether through cost push and seller's 
inflation or from errors in the money supply--then the new price level 
should be accepted as a fait accomplil. It would become the new line to 
be held in the following period, no attempt being made at adjusting 
prices to the previous target level. Based on the above considerations, 
the target supply can also be depicted as: 
(14) Mt = (Xt)(Pt)/mt = Yt/mt 
where Y = (Xt)(Pt), and denotes the target nominal income or target 
aggregate demand, and 
(15) m = Yt/Mt 
is the ratio of target income to the money supply needed to achieve that 
income level. 
It follows that the empirical estimate of income can be defined as real 
non oil GDP multiplied by the previous year's non-oil gdp deflater. The 
target money supply then becomes the empirical estimate of income 
times the observed income velocity of money (again on the assumption 
that velocity is independent of the money supply). 
Given that the country's explicitly stated policy objective is one of full 
employment with price stability, the target money supply stock, Mt, 
should be thought of as the stock of money that would have been need-
ed in period t to transact full employment income (Xt) at the target price 




The results of Modigliani's procedure (Tables 3 and 4) for 1960-79 are 
in general supportive of those found in the Bronfenbrenner method: 
I. Again, M3 and M4 are clearly poorer candidates than MC, Ml or 
M2 for monetary control. Non-oil GDP in general gives superior 
results to GDP. In any case, on theoretical grounds, it should be used 
as the income target. 
2. For the 1960-79 period, a constant expansion of the money supply 
from 12 to 14 percent seems to produce a mean fairly close to zero 
and a significantly lower standard deviation for M2. 
3. The rule is thus again superior to discretion. It should be noted that 




TEST OF THE MODIGLIANI MONETARY MODEL FOR SAUDI ARABIA 
(Gross Domestic Product) 
1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule= 80Jo 
MC -1.29 19.28 -0.29 -2.89 5.80 -1.50 -0.20 28.21 -0.02 
Ml 
M2 -3.29 17.82 -0.80 -2.71 4.24 - l.92 -4.43 26.30 -0.51 
w M3 -6.92 17.59 -1.72 -3.29 16.04 -0.61 -10.91 20.13 -1.63 
N M4 -8.70 14.89 -2.55 -5.58 14.34 - l.17 -12.25 16.31 -2.25 
Rule= 10% 
" 
., MC 0.54 19.63 0.12 -1.09 5.90 -0.55 1.65 28.73 0.17 
Ml -0.72 19.94 -0.16 0.78 4.80 0.49 -3.00 29.28 -0.31 
M2 -1.50 18.15 -0.36 -0.91 4.32 -0.63 -2.66 26.78 -0.30 
M3 -5.20 17.92 -1.26 -1.51 16.34 -0.28 -9.26 20.51 - l.35 
M4 -7.01 15.17 -2.01 -3.83 14.61 -0.79 -10.63 16.61 -1.92 
Rule= 12% 
MC 2.37 19.99 0.52 0.71 6.01 0.35 3.49 29.25 0.36 
Ml 1.08 20.30 23.29 2.61 4.88 l.60 -1.24 29.81 -0.12 
M2 0.29 18.48 6.94 0.89 4.39 0.61 -0.89 27.27 -0.10 
M3 -3.48 18.25 -0.83 0.28 16.64 0.05 -7.61 20.88 -1.09 
M4 -5.31 15.44 -1.50 -2.08 14.87 -0.42 -9.00 16.91 - l.60 
(Continued) 
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(Gross Domestic Product) 
1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule = 14ct/o 
MC 4.20 20.34 0.90 2.51 6.11 1.23 5.34 29.77 0.54 
Ml 2.89 20.67 0.61 4.44 4.97 2.68 0.52 30.34 0.05 
M2 2.09 18.81 0.48 2.70 4.49 1.81 0.88 27.76 0.09 
M3 -1.75 18.57 -0.41 2.08 16.93 0.37 -5.96 21.25 -0.84 




Ml 4.69 21.03 0.97 6.28 5.06 3.72 2.29 30.87 0.22 
M2 3.88 19.14 0.88 4.50 4.55 2.97 2.65 28.24 0.28 
M3 -0.03 18.90 -0.007 3.87 17.23 0.67 -4.31 21.62 -0.60 
M4 -1.93 15.99 -0.53 1.42 15.41 27.59 -5.75 17.52 -0.99 
Discretionary 
.I , . Policy :~/ 
MC 12.10 26.38 2.00 1.43 0.54 7.82 24.12 35.45 2.04 
Ml 12.10 26.38 2.00 1.43 0.54 7.82 24.12 35.45 2,04 
M2 12.10 26.38 2.00 1.43 0.54 7.82 24.12 35.45 2.04 
M3 12.10 26.38 2.00 1.43 0.54 7.82 24.12 35.45 2.04 
M4 12.10 26.38 2.00 1.43 0.54 7.82 24.12 35.45 2.04 
(Continued) 
(Non-Oil GDP) 
1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule= 80Jo 
MC -2.94 8.35 -1.54 -2.62 5.57 -1.41 -4.20 10.73 -1.18 
Ml -4.31 7.93 -2.37 -0.77 4.67 -0.49 -9.06 8.09 -3.36 
M2 -4.89 6.47 -3.29 -2.43 4.11 -1.77 -8.32 6.89 -3.62 
M3 -5.09 25.33 -0.88 -2.94 16.67 -0.53 -7.62 33.94 -0.67 
M4 -7.27 21.69 -1.46 -5.22 15.01 -1.04 -9.80 28.62 -1.03 
Rule = lOOJo 
w 
.I:>- MC -1.15 8.50 -0.58 -0.82 5.68 -0.43 -2.43 10.93 -0.67 
Ml -2.53 8.70 1.37 1.07 4.76 0.68 -7.38 8.24 -2.69 
.# 
-· 
M2 -3.13 6.59 -2.07 -0.61 4.18 -0.45 -6.63 7.02 -2.83 
M3 -3.33 25.80 -0.56 -1.14 16.98 -0.20 -5.91 34.57 -0.51 
M4 -5.55 22.09 -1.09 -3.47 15.28 -0.68 -8.13 29.15 -0.84 
Rule = 120Jo 
MC 0.65 8.66 32.79 0.99 5.78 0.51 -0.65 11.13 -0.18 
Ml -0.77 8.22 -0.40 2.91 4.84 1.80 -5.69 8.39 -2.04 
M2 -1.37 6.70 -0.89 1.18 4.26 0.83 -4.93 7.15 -2.07 
M3 -1.57 26.27 -0.26 0.66 17.29 0.11 4.20 35.20 -0.36 




1960 - 1979 1960 - 1969 1970 - 1979 
Standard T: Standard T: Standard T: 
Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 Mean Deviation Mean= 0 
Rule = 14% 
MC 2.45 8.81 1.21 2.79 5.88 1.42 1.12 11.32 0.30 
Ml 1.00 8.36 0.52 4.75 4.93 2.89 -4.01 8.54 -1.41 
M2 0.40 6.82 0.25 3.00 4.34 2.07 3.23 7.28 -1.33 
M3 -2.11 22.89 -0.40 0.04 15.83 0.007 -4.79 30.21 -0.48 
M4 
Rule = 16% 
Y.> MC 4.25 8.97 2.06 4.59 5.99 2.31 2.89 11.52 0.75 
VI 
Ml 
M2 2.16 6.95 1.35 4.80 4.41 3.26 -1.53 7.40 -0.62 
M3 1.94 27.21 0.31 4.25 17.91 0.71 -0.78 36.46 -0.06 
M4 -0.39 23.30 -0.o7 1.79 16.12 0.33 -3.12 30.74 -0.30 
.I 1• Discretionary 
Policy 
MC 10.41 16.02 2.83 1.74 1.82 2.87 20.02 19.41 3.09 
Ml 10.41 16.02 2.83 1.74 1.82 2.87 20.02 19.41 3.09 
M2 10.41 16.02 2.83 1.74 1.82 2.87 20.02 19.41 3.09 
M3 10.41 16.02 2.83 1.74 1.82 2.87 20.02 19.41 3.09 





SAUDI ARABIA: APPLICATION OF THE MODIGLIANI MONETARY MODEL 
(Non-Oil GDP) 
Discretionary 
lOOJo Rule 120Jo Rule 140Jo Rule Policy 
Ml M2 Ml M2 Ml M2 Ml M2 
1961 5.57 2.20 7.49 4.06 9.41 5.92 1.19 1.19 
1962 -1.20 0.82 0.59 0.98 2.39 2.79 0.00 0.00 
1963 -7.18 -7.19 -5.49 -5.50 -3.80 -3.82 2.35 2.36 
)964 8.81 5.26 10.79 7.17 12.77 9.09 3.45 3.45 
1965 0.47 -1.68 2.29 0.11 4.12 1.90 0.00 0.00 
w 1966 -3.00 -6.09 -1.24 -4.38 0.52 -2.68 I.II I.I I 
°' 
1967 0.71 -1.52 2.54 0.27 4.37 2.63 2.19 2.19 
1968 1.16 0.18 3.00 2.00 4.84 3.83 5.38 5.38 
,# ., 1969 4.31 4.05 6.21 5.95 8.10 7.84 0.00 0.00 
1970 8.50 5.81 10.48 7.73 12.45 9.66 2.04 2.04 
1971 1.62 -1.86 3.47 -0.08 5.31 1.71 2.00 2.00 
1972 -19.10 -17.97 -17.63 -16.48 -16.16 -14.99 4.90 4.90 
1973 -14.05 -10.94 -12.49 -9.32 - 10.93 -7.70 9.34 9.34 
1974 -8.24 -10.80 -6.58 -9.18 -4.91 -7.56 17.95 17.95 
1975 -6.23 -0.83 -4.53 0.98 -2.83 2.78 61.59 61.59 
1976 -9.79 -7.29 -8.16 -5.61 -6.51 -3.92 40.36 40.36 
1977 -14.95 -12.52 -13.40 -10.93 -11.86 -9.34 22.36 22.36 
1978 - 1.81 -1.25 -0.03 0.54 1.76 2.34 14.36 14.36 
1979 6.19 3.83 8.12 5.72 10.05 7.61 7.31 7.31 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summarizing the results obtained above: 
l. The foregoing evidence suggests that in Saudi Arabia's case, discre-
tionary monetay policy (inasmuch as it is realized that it is really 
fiscal policy that controls the money supply) is inferior to a fixed and 
steady expansion of the money supply (government expenditures); 
2. The fixed expansion rule is superior irrespective of the method of 
analysis; and 
3. The results seem to be in contrast to those of the United States where 
Modigliani favored discretion (although Bronfenbrenner's favored 
rules in the conduct of United States monetary policy). 
The policy rules analyzed here are, however, only intended to be sug-
gestive, with the burden of proof of discretionary policy placed on it's 
advocates. The point of the exercises presented above was simply to il-
lustrate how rules of thumb might be used--not to suggest an optimal 
rule. It should also be stressed that rules of thumb are just that; they are 
not great principles to which the Saudi policy makers would want to 
always mechanically adhere. If economic events in the country clearly 
indicated the desirability of abandoning a rule, then that should be the 
prerogative of the decision makers. What the results do say is that Saudi 
Arabian policy makers should be made aware of the desirability of 
stability and continuity in the conduct of policy. 
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